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Children aged 3–12 years (n = 184) with typical development, deafness, autism, or Asperger syndrome took a
series of theory-of-mind (ToM) tasks to confirm and extend previous developmental scaling evidence. A new
sarcasm task, in the format of H. M. Wellman and D. Liu’s (2004) 5-step ToM Scale, added a statistically reli-
able 6th step to the scale for all diagnostic groups. A key previous finding, divergence in task sequencing for
children with autism, was confirmed. Comparisons among diagnostic groups, controlling age, and language
ability, showed that typical developers mastered the 6 ToM steps ahead of each of the 3 disabled groups, with
implications for ToM theories. The final (sarcasm) task challenged even nondisabled 9-year-olds, demonstrat-
ing the new scale’s sensitivity to post-preschool ToM growth.
Theory of mind (ToM)—the explicit understanding
of how human behavior is governed by mental
states of belief, intention, memory, and desire—
develops rapidly for most children during the pre-
school years. Most 3-year-olds fail to demonstrate
explicit ToM-based awareness of representational
mental states, as assessed prototypically using false
belief (FB) tests that require predictions or explana-
tions about the actions or thoughts of protagonists
with beliefs that are out of line with reality. Yet, by
4 or 5 years, typically developing children pass so
consistently as to suggest that ‘‘understanding
belief and, relatedly, understanding of mind,
exhibit genuine conceptual change during the pre-
school period’’ (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001,
p. 655).
The developmental picture is complicated and
less understood for children with developmental
delays, such as autism (for reviews, see Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Happe´, 1995; Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, &
Solomonica-Levi, 1998), deaf children of hearing
parents (though not, interestingly their deaf peers
whose parents are deaf signers; Peterson, 2009;
Siegal & Peterson, 2008), as well as blind children
(Siegal & Peterson, 2008), and those with develop-
mental challenges such as severe maltreatment
(Sharp & Fonagy, 2008). One limitation of the
research with delayed and typically developing
children alike is its overwhelming focus on FB. A
genuine understanding of others’ minds cannot be
equated with performance on standard inferential
FB tests alone; ToM understanding evidences a pro-
gression of insights that unfold over development
(Pons, Lawson, Harris, & deRosnay, 2003; Wellman
& Liu, 2004). Comparisons across groups of chil-
dren from different backgrounds, in particular,
require more comprehensive developmental data.
In response to such concerns, Wellman and Liu
(2004) devised a developmental scale of ToM that
assesses multiple milestones in the growth of social
cognition. The scale charts five sequential steps in
explicit understanding of minds, using carefully
constructed tasks that match one another closely
in linguistic and procedural demands and their
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overall format and scoring. In brief, the specific
tasks comprising the scale, are (a) diverse desires
(DD; different people want different things), (b)
diverse beliefs (DB; different people have contrast-
ing, potentially true, beliefs about the same thing),
(c) knowledge access (KA; not seeing leads to not
knowing), (d) false belief (FB; standard misleading
container task), and (e) hidden emotion (HE; people
can feel a different emotion from the one they
display). Research with several hundred U.S. pre-
schoolers confirms a reliable five-step developmen-
tal progression that, with important variation,
generalizes to children growing up in different
countries and language communities (e.g., Kristen,
Thoermer, Hofer, Aschersleben, & Sodian, 2006;
Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu, 2006), and to
ToM-delayed children with autism or deafness
(Peterson & Wellman, 2009; Peterson, Wellman, &
Liu, 2005; Remmel & Peters, 2009).
Given this prior research and the scale’s poten-
tial to provide an extended metric of development,
several questions arise. Most focally, can the scale
be extended further to older children who have
already mastered FB? Would an extended scale
likewise apply reliably to children with deafness or
autism? If so, this new metric could assist in further
ToM research with older typically and atypically
developing groups—for example, in helping to
explain why, even after mastering FB, many pre-
adolescent children with autism continue to suffer
severe problems with social and peer relations
(Dissanayake & Macintosh, 2003; Peterson, Slaugh-
ter, & Paynter, 2007). Less focal to these primary
aims (but still of theoretical and practical interest)
would be to use such a scale to explore develop-
mental progressions for children with Asperger
syndrome (AS), a diagnostic group never previ-
ously included in ToM scaling research.
Later ToM Achievements
Potentially, any number of tasks could be harder,
thus later developing, than those in the current pre-
school scale. Indeed, any number of additional tasks
could measure preschool ToM as well. In keeping
with the original scale’s use of a small set of repre-
sentative but strictly scalable tasks, we sought a
single additional task that could extend the scale to
older (i.e., school-aged) children. Conceptually, we
sought a task related to everyday social-cognitive
demands but also one in keeping with the current
scale’s overall emphasis on understanding differ-
ences between mental states across people (e.g., self
vs. other) and differences between mental states and
reality (e.g., knowledge vs. ignorance or felt vs.
expressed emotions).
One promising everyday social problem that
may demand a more sophisticated level of mind-
reading skill than false belief or hidden-emotion
understanding is the appreciation of a speaker’s (or
writer’s) communicative intent in situations like
sarcasm, humor, and irony. Such nonliteral commu-
nicative situations conceptually require that the
listener ‘‘apprehend the mind that lies behind the
message’’ (Rajendran, Mitchell, & Rickards, 2005,
p. 434). Happe´ (1994) included both irony and
sarcasm in the items composing her ‘‘advanced’’
strange stories ToM test, while Filippova and
Astington (2008) similarly noted that ‘‘understand-
ing higher order representations of belief, intention,
and emotion is required . . . to comprehend indirect
speech acts’’ (p. 126).
Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that, for
typically developing children, the comprehension of
irony or sarcasm both follows and partially depends
upon earlier ToM mastery. Filippova and Astington
(2008) compared children aged 5, 7, and 9 and an
adult control group on eight items all requiring
explanations for story characters’ ironic statements
(e.g., saying ‘‘You’re a GREAT scorer’’ when some-
one misses an easy football kick). Performance was
fairly consistent across eight different story items
but clear age differences emerged. The 5-year-olds
often scored no better than chance, taking the ironic
remark at its literal face value, and believing the
speaker meant it as such. By age 7, many children
recognized that the utterance was not literally true
but failed to appreciate the speaker’s motivational
attitude. Even at age 9 only 25% of children under-
stood the irony fully enough to recognize that the
speaker’s pragmatic purpose was ‘‘teasing, joking or
being sarcastic’’ (p. 138). Standard ToM tests (Baner-
jee, 2000; Perner & Wimmer, 1985) were given to
assess the children’s understanding of second-order
FB and related concepts. Scores on these correlated
with irony ⁄ sarcasm scores at the univariate level
and continued to make a modest (though not always
significant) contribution once the influences of age,
receptive vocabulary, digit span, and prosody detec-
tion were taken into account.
For typically developing children, then, there are
good empirical grounds for believing that under-
standing nonliteral, ironic, or sarcastic messages is
a more advanced aspect of social cognition. How-
ever, despite some evidence for connections among
discrete pairs of tasks, no previous research has
mapped sarcasm’s place relative to a systematic
progression of ToM understandings.
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Delayed Groups With Deafness or Autism
Gregory, Bishop, and Sheldon’s (1995) interviews
with the hearing parents of deaf young adults who
had grown up in hearing households revealed per-
sistent adult difficulties with nonliteral language
and sarcastic humor even among those who were
functioning quite successfully both as mature com-
municators (in speech or sign) and in everyday life
within their communities. One hearing mother
reported that her 19-year-old daughter, a British
Sign Language (BSL) user, ‘‘doesn’t know the mean-
ing of a joke; if you say something, it’s serious. She
can’t see a double meaning . . . as far as language
goes, you can’t play around with it’’ (p. 33). In gen-
eral, verbal humor and sarcasm posed problems for
56% of this sample of severely or profoundly deaf
young adults, with no distinction between signers
(of BSL or Signed English) and oral-language users.
Unfortunately, no measures of ToM understanding
were included in Gregory et al.’s study. At the same
time, however, independent longitudinal evidence
(e.g., Peterson, 2009; Wellman, Fang, & Peterson,
2011) suggests that many deaf children and adoles-
cents of hearing parents do, very belatedly, manage
to master simpler ToM concepts. In particular, by
the ages of 10–12 years, many are finally able to pass
false belief and hidden-emotion items from the
Wellman and Liu scale (Wellman et al., 2011).
Together with Gregory et al.’s findings, this sug-
gests that understanding ironic, sarcastic expres-
sions might be a still later and problematic
achievement and one with significant real-life
importance for social interaction.
In parallel, there is evidence from children with
autism to show that problems understanding sar-
casm and irony persist even amongst the older,
very high-functioning minority with exceptionally
advanced language skills who eventually master
basic ToM concepts of FB. For example, Happe´
(1994) compared subgroups of children and adults
with autism who had passed (n = 12) versus failed
(n = 6) standard FB tasks in terms of their ability to
explain why story characters made a series of liter-
ally untrue statements, including comments that
were sarcastic or ironic (e.g., saying ‘‘That’s really
polite!’’ to someone who has been rude). Both sub-
groups were outperformed by typically developing
adult controls (who scored nearly perfectly). The
autistic FB passers in this small sample were signif-
icantly more likely to pass sarcasm and irony items
than others with autism who failed FB.
Similarly, Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) com-
pared groups of participants with high-functioning
autism, AS (see next section), or no disability on a
set of 18 nonliteral language stories that included
the irony and sarcasm stories described above.
Despite their perfect scores on a standard first-
order FB test, the groups with autism and AS were
significantly poorer at the nonliteral language items
than the controls. Thus, even for these unusually
advanced individuals on the autism spectrum, com-
prehension of nonliteral statements seemed to
require development beyond FB. A limitation of the
study, however, was failure to separate nonliteral
language forms like metaphor, that may require
literacy (a non-ToM skill that individuals on the
autism spectrum may also be slow to acquire) from
the sarcastic and ironic remarks that often arise in
social conversation.
Our primary aim was to include sarcastic irony
to attempt to extend the preschool ToM Scale one
further step to create an expanded scale usable with
older children. To best assess the nature and useful-
ness of this proposed scale expansion, we tested it
primarily with typically developing children, deaf
children of hearing parents, and children with
autism—three contrasting groups for which the ori-
ginal five-item scale has proved reliable and infor-
mative. We also explored possible use of the scale
with children with AS.
Asperger Syndrome
AS is a disorder on the autism spectrum that
shares with classic autism the problems of
impaired imagination ⁄ cognitive rigidity and poor
social communication ⁄ reciprocity, while lacking
the severe language delays that complete autism’s
clinically diagnostic triad (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2000). Despite this, research
on whether or not ToM development is delayed
for children with AS is inconclusive. Few direct
comparisons between AS and autism even on FB
tasks have been published and their findings are
mixed. Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard (1996) discov-
ered both these groups scored equally highly
(85%–90%) on a first-order FB test and, indeed,
equaled mental age-matched controls. However,
on a second-order FB task demanding a higher
level of recursive processing (e.g., ‘‘He thinks that
she thinks that X’’; Perner & Wimmer, 1985), the
typical controls outperformed those with AS and
autism, who continued to score equally (60% suc-
cess). Ozonoff, Rogers, and Pennington (1991)
similarly found no significant difference between
groups with AS versus autism on first-order FB
once language differences (vocabulary size) were
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statistically controlled. By contrast, two more recent
studies using batteries of FB tasks (Dissanayake &
Macintosh, 2003; Paynter & Peterson, 2010) found
better first-order false belief performance by those
with AS than autism, even after controlling for
verbal ability. Additionally, and contradictorily,
Paynter and Peterson (2010) found their AS sam-
ple performed equally to age- and language-
matched typically developing children, while
Dissanayake and Macintosh (2003) found younger
typical developers mastered FB ahead of older
children with AS.
Beyond this limited evidence for FB tasks alone,
the overall question of the extent to which individu-
als with AS are delayed in ToM understanding more
broadly remains almost unstudied, both in relation
to typically and atypically developing peers. Indeed,
it may not be possible to answer questions about
ToM delay in AS using FB tests alone. Owing to the
absence of language delay from its diagnostic criteria
(APA, 2000), AS is often not discovered until late pri-
mary school, at ages when FB is no longer optimally
sensitive to individual differences in social under-
standing, at least for typically developing children
who often score at ceiling. Consequently, for children
with AS in particular, we need more developmental
data on more advanced tasks in order to capture an
extended progression of ToM achievements. More
generally, for those with autism and deafness, as well
as AS, we know too little of their extended trajecto-
ries of ToM development, amidst delays, both up to
and beyond the traditional litmus criterion of FB
understanding.
Current Study
In short, more sensitive and encompassing
developmental comparisons of ToM between typi-
cally developing children and those with deafness
and autism are needed, and especially for ages and
developmental levels beyond the social-cognitive
insights achieved by young preschoolers. Thus, in
the current research, we adopt a scaling approach
but extend the prior ToM Scale for use with older
children. To do so, we focus on children’s under-
standing of a particular type of nonliteral message
that is a familiar part of children’s everyday family
and peer conversation, an understanding of sarcas-
tic irony. Among typical developers, we concen-
trate not only on preschoolers but also on those
aged 6–12, a group not previously tested on the
Wellman and Liu (2004) scale. We also study fresh
samples from populations assessed on the scale
previously and shown to encounter theoretically in-
triguing delays, namely, children with autism and
deaf children of hearing parents. These groups are
of special theoretical interest in light of Peterson
et al.’s (2005) findings (a) that deaf children from
hearing families were substantially delayed behind
hearing children in scale progress, although their
deaf peers and classmates who were native signers
(having grown up with signing deaf parents)
progressed through the ToM Scale as rapidly as
typical developers, and (b) that children with
autism progressed through the scale steps with the
same overall degree of delay as deaf children of
hearing parents but in a different order. Given its
potential relevance to theoretical accounts of how
ToM is acquired (e.g., Harris, 2006; Siegal & Peter-
son, 2008; Tager-Flusberg, 2003), it is important to
examine the possibility of ToM delays and possible
divergences and to do so across a broader scale of
ToM growth.
To summarize our multiple aims, first, we
explore the feasibility of extending the earlier five-
step ToM Scale developed for typically developing
preschoolers to span six reliably sequential steps.
Second, we compare typically developing chil-
dren’s scale progress to that of atypical developers
after controlling for influences of age and language
ability. Third, we examine five- and six-step Gutt-
man scale assessments of ToM for two diagnostic
groups of special theoretical interest—deaf children
of hearing parents and children with autism—to
see if six sequential steps are reliably scalable for
these groups and also whether a unique five-step
sequence previously noted for children with autism
is replicable. We also, for the first time, compare
extended ToM development by these two theoreti-
cally significant groups to their age-matched (as
well as preschool) typically developing peers.
Finally, although less focally, we examine ToM
Scale development in children with AS (a novel
diagnostic group not previously tested in scaling
studies) to explore how their scale progressions
and task patterns compare with those for children
with autism, on one hand, and those for typical
developers, on the other.
Method
Overview
We administered the Wellman and Liu (2004)
five-item ToM Scale, together with a test of under-
standing of sarcastic irony and a standardized
language ability test. We selected this sarcasm ⁄
irony task because it could be adjusted to a format
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closely parallel to that used in the five items of the
preschool ToM Scale. In keeping with that scale, we
focused on a single task to represent children’s
understanding of nonliteral communications (just
as the prior scale uses a single task to test under-
standing, e.g., of diversity of desires, or of FBs).
This feature of the prior scale, and of the current
extension, means that it can be conducted in a sin-
gle short (15 min) session. Thus, the scale lends
itself for use with delayed groups who may have
difficulties with more extended testing sessions,
limited availability for research participation, or
may require a broad range of assessments over and
above social cognition.
Participants
Four groups totaling 184 Australian children
participated; aged 3–13 years. Group 1 had 31 late-
signing deaf children (mean age = 9.62 years,
range = 6–12; 18 boys, 13 girls), Group 2 had 44 chil-
dren with autism (M = 9.02, range = 5–12; 37 boys, 7
girls), Group 3 had 41 children with AS (M = 9.52,
range = 5–12; 30 boys, 11 girls), and Group 4
included 68 typically developing children subdi-
vided into three age groups. Group 4A, the oldest,
had 29 children (M = 8.77 years, range = 7.5–11.5; 17
boys, 12 girls). This was the primary (age matched)
control for statistical comparisons of scale progress
across diagnostic groups. There were no significant
age differences among Groups 1, 2, 3, and 4A, F(3,
141) = 1.52, p > .20.
To examine a wide range of ages and ToM abili-
ties—important for optimal Guttman scaling and
for more precise mapping of ToM delays relative to
normative patterns—we included younger typically
developing children. Group 4B had 16 primary
schoolers aged 6–7.5 years (M = 6.96; 8 boys, 8
girls) and Group 4C contained 23 preschoolers aged
3–5 years (M = 4.75; 8 boys, 15 girls).
To insure the precise diagnostic identification of
the children with autism, and the differentiation
between AS and autism groups, our sample was
stringently selected using the accepted ‘‘gold stan-
dard’’ (Szatmari et al., 2009) of expert clinical judg-
ment according to DSM–IV (APA, 2000) criteria
with the added precaution that these DSM–IV-
based differential diagnoses were conferred and
verified by trained clinicians (including at least
one qualified pediatrician or psychiatrist) working
independently of the authors and blind to the out-
come measures of our research. Children who
received a mixed diagnosis or one that was not
precisely AS or autism (e.g., ‘‘autism spectrum
disorder’’ or ‘‘PDD-NOS’’), were not included.
Furthermore, we excluded any deaf or typically
developing child who, according to the teacher
had been diagnosed or suspected of having an aut-
ism spectrum disorder or other disability (apart
from hearing loss).
Children were recruited from local schools with
predominantly middle-class socioeconomic catch-
ments on the basis of their parents’ written consent.
No children with other diagnosed conditions (e.g.,
blindness, intellectual disability) were included.
The deaf children all attended specialist units
where a signed language (Signed English or
Auslan) was the primary communication medium.
Those with autism and AS attended specialist units
exclusive to autism spectrum disorders. Apart from
the deaf, all children and their families spoke Eng-
lish as their sole or primary language.
Tasks and Scoring
ToM Scale tasks. The five-item ToM Scale
(Wellman & Liu 2004)—including (a) DD, (b) DB,
(c) KA, (d) FB, and (e) HE—was given precisely in
the format described by Peterson et al. (2005; see
See p. 517 of their article for the exact wording of
all questions and instructions, together with stim-
uli, procedure and scoring). Conceptually, all the
tasks asked about a focal contrast between a protag-
onist’s inner psychological state (e.g., ignorance, FB,
felt emotion) and either reality (e.g., true contents,
overt facial expression) or the mental state of
another protagonist (e.g., own vs. other’s belief).
All tasks were presented with the aid of drawings
and ⁄or toy figurines and all had a similar format
involving a test question and at least one compre-
hension control question. As in Peterson et al.
(2005), we required correct responses to all control
as well as test questions to pass any given task.
With one exception (apart from local substitutions
like ‘‘biscuit’’ for ‘‘cookie’’), the tasks were identical
to Wellman and Liu (2004).
The exception was the HE task where we fol-
lowed Peterson et al. (2005) in using an additional
explanation question and, consequently, using an
alternative to the original scoring procedure (see
Peterson et al., 2005, p. 517, for exact details). Stim-
ulus pictures (e.g., sad, okay, happy face cartoons)
and procedures were identical to Wellman and Liu
(2004) but we added an extra comprehension con-
trol question: ‘‘Why did he try to look [sad, okay,
happy]?’’ to follow-up test question responses. This
verified children’s understanding of the stimulus
story, and disambiguated a possible confound in
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the original procedure. Originally, a child who had
selected ‘‘sad’’ as the boy’s true emotion could pass
the test question simply by pointing at the ‘‘happy’’
or ‘‘neutral’’ cartoon on the three-face scale. How-
ever, pilot work with a separate sample of children
and adults showed that the supposedly neutral
(middle) picture was often spontaneously labeled
as ‘‘angry,’’ so pointing at this face could (incor-
rectly) indicate negative rather than neutral
emotion. Addition of the ‘‘why’’ follow-up disam-
biguated this. Correct responses required that any
child who had merely pointed should either indi-
cate a social motive (e.g., ‘‘so they don’t tease
more,’’ ‘‘to make them stop’’) or should allude to
the hiding of feelings (e.g., ‘‘so no one knows’’). A
reliability coder, blind to respondents’ ages, group
membership and performance on other tasks, inde-
pendently scored the responses of 60 children who
had been randomly selected from each diagnostic
group. Agreement with the primary coder was
95%.
A method that includes explanations had the
additional benefit of making the format for HE very
comparable to that used in the new task testing
understanding of the social use of nonliteral lan-
guage in sarcasm. This task was modeled closely
on one of the sarcasm items in Happe´ (1995). Rajen-
dran et al. (2005) used a similar story which they
deemed to measure both irony and sarcasm. In our
version (SARC), adapted for ease of translation into
sign and to insure suitable comparability in style
and format to the other five ToM Scale tasks, chil-
dren were told:
The girl and boy are going on a picnic. It is the
boy’s idea. He says it will be a lovely sunny day.
But when they get the food out, big storm clouds
come. It rains and the food gets all wet. The girl
says: ‘‘It’s a lovely day for a picnic.’’
A colored line drawing showed the back of a
girl’s and a boy’s head, raindrops, and a wet cake
and other food on a picnic rug. The tester read the
story aloud without any special intonation or
emphasis. There was a preliminary question, taken
from Happe´ (1994): ‘‘Is it true, what the girl said?’’
and a test question: ‘‘Why did the girl say ‘it’s a
lovely day for a picnic’?’’ plus a comprehension
control question new to this study: ‘‘Was the girl
happy about the rain?’’ Thus the task format very
closely parallels the HE task both pictorially and in
its types and formats of questions: both have a
control question asking about true emotion and a
similar ‘‘why’’ test question.
As for the five other tasks, children had to pass
the control question in order to pass SARC. Con-
trol-question failures were actually rare. Only 9 of
184 children (5%) failed the SARC control by agree-
ing the girl was happy about the rain or by saying
‘‘don’t know,’’ and none of these children would
have passed the task, even if the control were
ignored.
Our criteria for passing SARC were closely mod-
eled on Filippova and Astington’s (2008) scoring of
a similar ‘‘why’’ question for their sarcastic irony
story. Correct ‘‘why’’ answers either mentioned sar-
casm explicitly or else alluded in some other way
(e.g., ‘‘joking,’’ ‘‘doesn’t mean it’’) to a contrast
between the literal meaning of the words ‘‘lovely
day’’ and the speaker’s intended meaning. This
scoring conforms with widely accepted definitions
of irony or sarcasm as intending to mean the
‘‘opposite of the literal meaning of a sentence’’
(Rajendran et al., 2005, p. 434). Sample responses
scored as correct versus wrong are shown in the
Appendix. An independent reliability coder, blind
to respondents’ age, gender, group membership,
and the hypotheses of the study, coded a random
selection of 90 responses, representing all diagnos-
tic groups. Agreement with the primary coder was
97%.
ToM-6 and ToM-5 summary scores. For each of the
six items children earned a score of 1 for a pass,
otherwise a 0. Thus, total scores for the original
five-item ToM Scale (ToM-5) ranged from 0 to 5,
and for a new six-item ToM Scale (ToM-6), they
ranged from 0 to 6.
Language ability. To assess linguistic maturity,
we used the 22-item syntax subscale of the Clinical
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals test (CELF–
Preschool; Wiig, Secord, & Semel, 1992). This test
(a) has been used effectively in earlier ToM
research with typically developing children (e.g.,
Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002) and (b) is uniquely
suitable for validly assessing linguistic maturity
among signing deaf Auslan- or Signed- English
users in Group 1. These deaf children cannot
validly be assessed with other commonly used recep-
tive vocabulary measures—like the Peabody Picture
Vocabulary Test—for numerous reasons, inclu-
ding the large proportion of iconic signs (e.g.,
‘‘knee’’ = pointing at the knee) in Australian signed
languages. Via a picture-pointing response mode,
the CELF–Preschool syntax subscale assesses a
broad range of developmentally sequenced lexical,
morphological, and syntactic concepts (including
verb tense, relative clauses and embedded con-
structions). Appropriately, several of these items
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were found to challenge even the oldest typical
developers in our sample. Thus, this CELF subscale
provided an adequate range of raw score variability
(4–22) not only for the sample as a whole but also
within each of the six separate subgroups. (CELF
scores were available for all 85 of the children with
AS or autism, for 30 or the 31 deaf children [97%],
and for 56 of the typical developers including,
importantly, 27 [90%] in the focal age-matched
subgroup). We used raw scores as the dependent
measure (as advocated by the test manual for
un-normed groups like ours).
Procedure
Each child was tested individually by one of
three highly experienced experimenters in two ses-
sions, one for the language test and one for the
ToM measures. For these latter, six different task
orders were used, randomly assigned across the
sample. To maximize motivation and involvement,
all orders began with one of the three tasks that
previous studies of children from the same popula-
tions have established are easiest, namely, DD, DB,
or KA.
Owing to their preference to communicate in
sign rather than speech, for deaf children the main
experimenter was assisted by one of four sign lan-
guage interpreters, all with professional-level quali-
fications in the particular sign language used in
each deaf child’s classroom (Signed Australian Eng-
lish [84%] or Auslan [16%]) as well as with each
child’s own particular sign language preferences.
The interpreter, seated beside the experimenter in
full view of the participant, translated the experi-
menter’s speech into the child’s preferred mode of
sign language, using an interpretation style familiar
to these children in their everyday school routines.
Interpreters paused when critical pictures or figu-
rine actions were introduced and, before contin-
uing, both adults monitored that the child’s
gaze was directed at the stimuli or interpreter, as
appropriate. They independently recorded pointing
responses and subsequent matching of their records
revealed complete agreement. The interpreter also
supplied an ongoing oral translation of all the
child’s signed communication, which was recorded
by the experimenter on data sheets. We developed
tasks, test questions, and appropriate translations
of the CELF items in close consultation with native
speakers of Auslan and Signed Australian English
to insure appropriate translation into these lan-
guages. Our interpreters were well practiced both
in signed translation and in the importance of
adhering exactly to the script, with the experi-
menter monitoring the latter.
Results
Overview
We begin by examining the data for typically
developing children in order to ascertain if the
SARC task is a significantly more advanced and
difficult task than others on the scale, if it is
passed by enough typically developing children to
insure it is a genuine developmental progression,
and whether it provides an appropriate and statis-
tically reliable extension to the ToM Scale. Further-
more, given that no previous study using the
five-step preschool scale has included a sample of
typically developing children as old as the present
one, we examined whether the earlier established
progression, together with the new step, would
prove replicable for this more extended sample
ranging up to 11.5 years and we examined
whether these children’s overall ToM Scale growth
is reliably predicted by age and ⁄or language
ability.
After establishing scale properties for the typi-
cally developing group, we then compared the
atypically developing groups with them in scale
performance. Using hierarchical regression, and
after controlling statistically for variations in
language ability, we assessed the independent
contributions of age (a marker of progressive con-
ceptual development) and developmental condi-
tion (e.g., autism) to children’s overall pace of
progress through the six-step scale. This initial
information allowed us to test the Guttman scale
conformity of predicted five-step and six-step
developmental sequences for our two focal atypi-
cally developing groups—children with autism
and deaf children of hearing parents—addressing
the research questions outlined earlier, including
(a) how well deaf children’s patterns match our
prediction of delayed but statistically reliable con-
formity to the typical hearing children’s six-step
Guttman scale sequence, (b) replicability of the
previously observed (Peterson et al., 2005) unique
five-step sequence for autism and its capacity for
extension to six Guttman scale steps, and (c) how
individual task performance compares among
these children and their peers with typical devel-
opment. Finally, we tested in a more explor-
atory fashion whether children with AS progress
in ToM understanding via the autism-specific
sequence or the standard one, and how their
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overall rate of scale progress compares with that
of children with autism on one hand, or typical
development on the other.
Typically Developing Children
The 68 typically developing children spanned a
wide range of ToM understandings, from passing
only one or two tasks (13%) to perfect performance
on all six (26%). As shown in Table 1, fewer of
them passed SARC (31%) than HE (53%), notwith-
standing the procedural and conceptual similarities
between these tasks that were outlined under
Method. Comparing just these two tasks, there
were 19 typically developing children who passed
either SARC or HE, but not both. Seventeen of them
(89%) passed HE only, whereas just 2 passed only
SARC. The difference between these tasks was sta-
tistically significant, Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
z = 3.44, p = .001, two-tailed.
Given this evidence for SARC’s appropriate level
of difficulty, we used Green’s (1956) statistical
procedures to assess conformity of typically devel-
oping children’s response patterns to a perfect six-
step Guttman scale in which any child who passes
a harder task in the series will have passed each of
the easier ones, and no child who fails any given
task will have passed a later one. The responses of
59 of the 68 typical developers (87%) were perfectly
consistent with the predicted six-step scale:
DD > DB > KA > FB > HE > SARC. Green’s index
of reproducibility (Rep), assessing scale conformity
(with values above .90 deemed significant) was .98.
Green’s index of consistency (I ), a more stringent
criterion that compares observed sequences with all
that might be expected by chance (with values
above .50 considered statistically significant) was
.76.
Guttman analyses can be subject to skew when
there are numerous items that most children in a
sample pass. Even though our older children often
did pass all the easier items, a further scalogram
analysis for the typical group using only their
responses to the four most difficult scale items (i.e.,
KA, FB, HE, and SARC; see Table 1) yielded strong
evidence of scale reproducibility and consistency;
65 of 68 (96%) responded to the four advanced
items in a manner that was perfectly scale consis-
tent. Green’s Rep was .99 and I was .89, both signif-
icant.
Although SARC was clearly harder, it was not
impossible: Twelve of the 29 (41%) oldest typical
developers passed (see Table 1), as did 21 (31%) of
the 68 typically developing children as a whole.
Thus, the new task adds a further and more chal-
lenging scale step that allows charting progressive
ToM growth across a broad age range (3–11 years).
FB (ToM’s traditional litmus criterion) occupies an
intermediate point in this extended scale.
Age correlated significantly with total scale steps
passed (ToM-6), r(66) = .64, p < .001, as well as
with language scores on the CELF, r(54) = .72,
Table 1
Means and Correct Responses on Key Measures by Diagnostic and Age Groupings
Diagnosis (group)
Typically developing
Deafness
(Group 1)
Autism
(Group 2)
Asperger syndrome
(Group 3)
Oldest
(Group 4A)
Middle
(Group 4B)
Youngest
(Group 4C)
N 29 16 23 31 44 41
Age (SD) 8.77 (1.15) 6.96 (0.40) 4.75 (0.90) 9.62 (1.70) 9.02 (2.12) 9.52 (2.16)
Mean CELFa (SD) 21.85 (0.37) 20.91 (1.22) 19.53 (1.50) 17.87 (2.99) 17.45 (5.14) 20.20 (2.55)
Pass DD 29 (100%) 14 (88%) 22 (96%) 29 (94%) 41 (93%) 40 (98%)
Pass DB 29 (100%) 15 (94%) 19 (83%) 29 (94%) 38 (86%) 38 (93%)
Pass KA 29 (100%) 16 (100%) 17 (74%) 20 (64%) 31 (70%) 36 (88%)
Pass FB 29 (100%) 11 (69%) 10 (43%) 16 (52%) 19 (43%) 26 (63%)
Pass HE 23 (79%) 8 (50%) 5 (22%) 6 (19%) 23 (52%) 26 (63%)
Pass SARC 12 (41%) 8 (50%) 1 (4%) 1 (3%) 10 (23%) 11 (27%)
Mean total (ToM-6)b (SD) 5.21 (0.73) 4.50 (1.46) 3.22 (1.28) 3.26 (1.36) 3.68 (1.70) 4.32 (1.47)
Mean total (ToM-5; SD) 4.79 (0.42) 4.00 (1.03) 3.17 (1.19) 3.23 (1.31) 3.45 (1.40) 4.05 (1.20)
DD = diverse desires; DB = diverse beliefs; KA = knowledge access; FB = false belief; HE = hidden emotion; SARC = sarcasm
understanding.
aVerbal ability (raw syntax score on Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals–Preschool Test). bTotal score on new six-step ToM
Scale.
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p < .001. CELF and ToM-6 were also significantly
correlated, r(54) = .65, p < .001. With language abil-
ity partialled out, ToM-6 remained significantly cor-
related with age, r(53) = .37, p < .01, indicating that
the new ToM Scale captured developmental pro-
gress on ToM understandings over and above any
influence of language. Conversely, with age par-
tialled out, CELF and ToM-6 scores also remained
correlated, r(53) = .33, p < .02, highlighting the
independent roles of both conceptual develop-
ment—with age as its proxy here—and language
development to typically developing children’s pro-
gressive mastery of sequential steps in ToM under-
standing.
Comparisons of Typical Development With That of
Children With Deafness, Autism, or AS
This favorable developmental and scaling evi-
dence underwrites comparisons of the overall pace
of ToM Scale progress between typically and atypi-
cally developing groups. For these latter analyses,
we selected only the oldest typically developing
subgroup (Group 4A) to compare with children
with deafness, autism, and AS since these four
groups were well matched in age (see the Method
section). Table 1 shows mean numbers of ToM-6
steps passed, as well as means on other variables
including the CELF language ability test where a
significant group difference, F(3, 137) = 11.28,
p < .001, g2 = .20, reflected Groups 3 and 4A equal-
ing one another but significantly outperforming
children with deafness and autism, who did not
differ significantly.
Given this language ability contrast, we used
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to compare
ToM-6 scores across groups with chronological
age and CELF raw scores as the covariates, F(3,
135) = 5.75, p < .01, g2 = .11. Simple-effects planned
comparisons showed that the typical developers in
Group 4A scored significantly higher than children
with AS, autism, and deafness (all ps < .02). When
only the two focal delayed groups (children with
deafness or with autism) were compared with one
another in the same ANCOVA design, the differ-
ence did not achieve statistical significance, F(1,
70) = 3.95, p > .05, g2 = .05, and a simple-effects
planned comparison was likewise nonsignificant.
Similarly, on the original five-step preschool scale,
an ANCOVA with age and language scores covar-
ied showed a significant overall difference among
the four groups, F(3, 135) = 4.96, p < .01, g2 = .10,
which again reflected significantly higher scores for
Group 4A than for each of the others (all ps < .02).
Again, when children with autism versus deafness
were contrasted via the same ANCOVA design,
there was no significant difference, F(1, 70) = 2.08,
p > .15, g2 = .03, confirming a previous finding for
different children from these same diagnostic
groups (Peterson et al., 2005).
Thus, children with autism and with deafness
were delayed relative to typically developing chil-
dren on both the original (ToM-5) and extended
scales (ToM-6). Importantly, these delays were
apparent even after controlling statistically for age
and language ability.
Independent Influences of Age, Language Skill, and
Disability Type on Overall ToM Growth
Just as for the typical developers (see above),
simple correlations between chronological age and
ToM-6 total scores were statistically significant for
children with deafness, autism, and AS, r(29) = .63,
p < .001; r(42) = .48, p < .01; and r(39) = .47, p < .01,
respectively. The same was true of correlations
between ToM-6 and language ability, r(28) = .85,
p < .001; r(42) = .33, p < .05; and r(39) = .75,
p < .001. We used a hierarchical regression analysis
to more comprehensively examine the separate
contributions of age and language ability to chil-
dren’s ToM-6 performance. Diagnostic group status
was also included in order to see whether any of
the specific developmental conditions we examined
(deafness, autism or AS) made additional contribu-
tions over and above age and language skill to the
total number of ToM steps children passed. The
entire typically developing sample was included to
optimize power and sensitivity for this analysis.
When CELF language scores were entered as the
control variable at Step 1, they predicted ToM-6
scores as expected, R = .55, R2 = .30, Adj. R2 = .30,
F(1, 169) = 72.90, p < .001. Importantly, the entry of
chronological age as a separate predictor at Step 2
resulted in a statistically significant increment in
the prediction, R2 change = .06, F change(1, 168)
= 15.68, p < .001, and the full regression equation
also remained significant, R = .60, R2 = .36, Adj.
R2 = .35, F(2, 168) = 47.46, p < .001. Thus, even after
controlling for language, children’s progressive
conceptual development (with age as its marker
here) significantly contributed to overall progress
through the ToM-6 Scale. At the final step, with the
en bloc entry of diagnoses of deafness, autism, or
AS (each dummy coded as 1 = present or
0 = absent, as recommended by Tabachnik & Fidell,
1996), there was a further significant increment
in ToM-6 variability predicted, R2 change = .07,
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F change (3, 165) = 6.43, p < .001. The full model
was likewise significant, F(5, 165) = 24.69, p < .001;
R = .65, R2 = .43, Adj. R2 = .41. Inspection of
final beta weights indicated that the six separate
predictor variables each made statistically signifi-
cant contributions, all arising independently of one
another: (a) age: b = .44, t = 5.74, p < .001; (b) deaf-
ness: b = ).36, t = 4.38, p < .001; (c) linguistic abil-
ity: b = .32, t = 4.30, p < .001; (d) autism: b = ).24,
t = 2.80, p < .01; and (e) AS: b = ).20, t = 2.64,
p < .05. In other words, not only did chronological
age exert an independently predictive influence
over and above linguistic maturity in the total num-
ber of ToM-6 steps that children passed, so did the
independent influences of each type of develop-
mental condition.
Scale Progressions for Focal Groups With Deafness or
Autism
These data on overall scale totals set the stage
for examining key questions about developmental
sequences of ToM understanding for our focal
groups. Building upon Peterson et al.’s (2005) dis-
covery of two distinct and reliable five-step ToM
Scales, one characterizing deaf children (and typi-
cally developing preschoolers) and the other
specific to children with autism, for the deaf chil-
dren, we predicted statistically reliable conformity
to the same six-step scale that was validated above
for the present typically developing group (DD >
DB > KA > FB > HE > SARC), whereas for those
with autism, we predicted an alternative sequence,
namely: DD > DB > KA > HE > FB > SARC where
HE and FB steps were reversed.
Scale-consistent six-step sequences were ob-
served for 29 of the 31 deaf children (94%). Green’s
Rep was .98 and I was .75 (both significant) con-
firming the same six-step Guttman progression as
for the typically developing children. It is worth
comparing these scaling statistics to corresponding
values obtained by Peterson et al. (2005) for a dif-
ferent sample of late-signing deaf children on the
original 5-point ToM Scale. For those children, Rep
was .95 and I was .58. Thus, despite including an
extra step, the present values compare very favor-
ably. Note that 3, and only 3, deaf children in the
present group (< 10%) had been previously
included among the 36 late signers reported by
Peterson et al. (2005), but they were tested at such
different ages (11;3, 12;0, and 11;4 here vs. 5;5, 6;1,
and 6;10 there) that their ToM understanding is
unlikely to have remained the same. Just like typi-
cal developers, deaf children did worse on SARC
than on HE, z = 2.24, p < .05, two-tailed Wilcoxon
test.
Of the 44 children with autism, 35 (80%)
displayed individual response patterns that were
perfectly scale consistent with their alternative
sequence (DD, DB, KA, HE, FB, SARC). Rep was
.96 and I was .67, both significant. For comparison,
Rep for the autism-specific five-step scale in Peter-
son et al. (2005) was .95 and I was .55 for their
entirely separate sample. Thus, for children with
autism or deafness, just as for the typically devel-
oping group, extending the scale to a further step
of ToM-based sarcasm understanding provided a
highly reliable, extended Guttman scale sequence.
Pairwise task comparisons showed that SARC was
passed significantly less often than HE by children
with autism, z = 3.61, p < .001, two-tailed Wilcoxon
test.
These data confirm a pattern from a previous
study (Peterson et al., 2005) in which children with
autism often passed the HE task out of the standard
sequence (where FB precedes HE), while deaf and
typical groups did not. To see if this specific con-
trast was replicable, we examined the numbers of
children in each group who passed HE while fail-
ing FB, versus those displaying one of the three
other patterns (i.e., passing FB not HE or failing or
passing both tasks). No deaf child and only one
typical developer (1%) did so, in contrast to nine
children with autism (20%), v2(N = 143, df = 2) =
17.78, p < .001.
Comparing patterns of individual task success
and failure, the deaf and autistic groups both per-
formed equally on four of the six tasks: v2(N = 75,
df = 1) for DD, DB, KA, FB all < 1, all ps > .50.
Those with autism did better on HE than both the
deaf, v2(N = 75, df = 1) = 6.98, p < .01, and typically
developing preschoolers (Group 4C), v2(N = 67,
df = 1) = 4.60, p < .05 (all ps two-tailed, continuity
corrected). Deaf children performed worse than
even those with autism on SARC, v2(N = 75,
df = 1) = 4.08, p < .05.
Children With AS
The children with AS performed no better than
those with autism on any individual task, all
v2(N = 85, df = 1) < 2.87, all ps > .08. Furthermore,
they were just as likely as those with autism to pass
HE while failing FB, v2(N = 85, df = 1) = 1.14,
p > .25, and in this respect the two autism spectrum
groups differed significantly from their peers in
Groups 1 and 4, v2(N = 184, df = 3) = 16.80,
p < .001. Similarly, those with AS were no more
478 Peterson, Wellman, and Slaughter
likely than those with autism to pass FB while fail-
ing HE, v2(N = 85, df = 1) = .06, p > .75. The AS
group’s mean ToM-6 score (see Table 1) was not
significantly higher than the autism group’s either
before, t(83) = 1.84, p = .07, or after, F(1, 81) < 1,
p > .40, g2 = .01, controlling for age and CELF score
differences via ANCOVA. Like each of the other
groups, the children with AS found SARC signifi-
cantly more difficult than HE, z = 3.87, p < .001,
two-tailed Wilcoxon test.
With regard to scale progressions, in the
absence of any previous evidence on ToM Scale
sequencing for children with AS, we made no
specific predictions but instead tested these chil-
dren’s conformity to each of the six-step
sequences. Just as for those with autism, AS
group’s response patterns conformed to the dis-
tinctive six-step progression (HE > FB); 36 of the
41 children (88%) displayed response patterns that
were perfectly consistent with this sequence and
Rep = .97 and I = .67 were both statistically signif-
icant. However, although a numerically smaller
proportion of children with AS (80% vs. 88%, ns)
performed consistently with the typical develop-
ers’ sequence (FB > HE) than with the autism one,
Guttman scaling statistics (Rep = .97, I = .66) were
significant for this order as well. Note that 7 chil-
dren with AS had six-step scale patterns that
were perfectly consistent with only one of these
sequences, not both. Of these, 5 (71%) were con-
sistent with the autism sequence only, compared
to only 2 (28%) with the original sequence,
p > .20, two-tailed binomial test.
Discussion
These results provide several essential contribu-
tions. First and foremost, we validated a needed
extension of the preschool ToM Scale (Wellman &
Liu, 2004) so that it is now possible to chart the pro-
gress of ToM across six reliably sequential steps
capturing a succession of changes, including those
normatively arising in middle childhood, after FB is
mastered. Our validation of this extended scale is
particularly robust and useful because we provide
data not only for younger and older typically devel-
oping children but also those with autism and deaf
children of hearing parents. Second, the new scale’s
capacity to examine extended ToM trajectories for
these two particular atypically developing groups
is of special theoretical interest. As a single prefa-
tory example, we confirm that the developmental
sequence for children with autism is not only
delayed but also uniquely different from that for
other children. Third, by controlling statistically for
individual differences in language ability, our
study establishes that mastery of extended ToM
progressions by typically and atypically developing
children represents conceptual developments aris-
ing independently of increasing language compe-
tence alone—age predicted overall scale progress
independently of linguistic maturity for all groups,
with each specific disability type making additional
independent contributions. No prior scaling study
provides such data. Finally, the new scale enabled
us to address, for the first time, a progression of
ToM steps in children with AS, while comparing
their progress to both autistic and typically devel-
oping groups.
An Extended ToM Scale That Adds an Understanding
of Sarcasm
A primary contribution of our study is the con-
firmation of a sixth, advanced step in the develop-
mental sequence of ToM understanding. To create
this extended scale, we added a task assessing
understanding of nonliteral language, modified so
as to conform to the structural and linguistic
formats of the well-established preschool ToM Scale
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). We focused on under-
standing irony or sarcasm owing partly to prior
research (e.g., Filippova & Astington, 2008; Happe´,
1994) suggesting that sophisticated ‘‘mindreading’’
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) is needed to genuinely under-
stand it. Moreover, unlike many other nonliteral
language forms, sarcastic, ironic interchange is a
natural element in children’s everyday conversation
and social life. The results of our Guttman scaling
analyses (which utilize a stringent approach to scal-
ing; Festinger, 1947) confirmed the new sarcasm
task’s sequentiality with the other scale steps. At
the same time, and as hoped, that task’s require-
ment to understand discrepancies between spoken
communicative intent and literal word meaning
clearly made it substantially difficult for all groups
of children. Specifically, it was more difficult than
HE (previously the final scale step) and thus more
difficult than understanding discrepancies between
intended emotional expressions and true feelings.
This sequential difference emerges despite close
methodological and linguistic parallels between
these tasks and despite their both reflecting familiar
everyday aspects of children’s social life requiring
comprehension of the distinction between what is
expressed versus what is felt. Yet, analyses also
showed that while reliably more advanced in its
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cognitive ToM demands, the new sarcasm test was
appropriately within the grasp of many older typi-
cally developing children, as well as at least some
children with each of the other developmental
conditions and that, even when they failed, the vast
majority of children in all groups responded cor-
rectly to that task’s control question.
This extended six-step scale seems a valuable
addition to the ToM literature both psycho-
metrically and theoretically. Psychometrically, it is
valuable to have a reliable sequential index of
developmental progress that extends measurement
of ToM beyond (but also includes) normative, pre-
school achievements such as FB. This increases the
potential age range for longitudinal (e.g., Wellman
et al., 2011) and cross-cultural (e.g., Wellman et al.,
2006) studies of social cognition in children with
and without developmental delay. Moreover, the
new scale offers fresh opportunities for fine-grained
cross-sectional study of individual differences in
ToM mastery, both within and between diagnostic
groups. Understanding of nonliteral language
clearly requires insight into the speaker’s mind (Fi-
lippova & Astington, 2008) and sarcasm is superior
to other more academic kinds of nonliteral lan-
guage (e.g., simile, analogy, or metaphor) through
being a natural element in children’s everyday con-
versation and social life, and a well known prob-
lematic aspect of peer interaction for children
autism or AS (e.g., Attwood, 2007) and for deaf
children of hearing parents (e.g., Gregory et al.,
1995).
In contrast, another commonly used test of
advanced mental-state reasoning, the child version
of the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’’ test (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Scahill, Spong, & Larson,
2001) is precluded from a developmental scale like
the present one for several reasons. It includes 28
separate items, each in four-choice response for-
mats that demand reading ages of about 10 years.
Purely oral presentation to preliterate children (as
were many in the present sample) is not feasible,
requiring them to comprehend and remember four
different emotion labels (e.g., ‘‘ashamed,’’ ‘‘guilty,’’
‘‘not believing,’’ ‘‘disgruntled’’) per item (totaling
112 for the test as a whole) in order to make
informed response choices. Indeed, Peterson and
Slaughter (2009) found that these oral memory
demands posed severe challenges even to adult
university students, who displayed little response
consistency when given the test in this purely oral
manner.
Perner and Wimmer’s (1985) second-order FB
test, requiring recursive understanding of one story
character’s belief about another’s belief, is another
frequently used individual measure of older chil-
dren’s ToM. Like eye-reading, this task was also
unsuitable for our scale partly owing to its method-
ology (e.g., a long and complex narrative with
numerous essential test and control questions).
More important, it would have been hard to inter-
pret second-order task failure compared with failing
our other scale items owing to the added executive,
linguistic, and memory demands imposed by its
procedure. Just as the eye-reading test requires
literacy, the second-order task requires advanced
domain-general executive functions (e.g., memory
and planning), as well as advanced syntax simply to
follow the procedure. These demands could extend
the task’s developmental trajectories, quite irrespec-
tive of its ToM demands. In fact, this non-ToM inter-
pretation is suggested by Sullivan, Zaitchik, and
Tager-Flusberg’s (1994) finding that even 4-year-
olds could pass a modified second-order task with
multiple reminders, prompts, corrections, and story
repeats to reduce its domain-general cognitive bur-
dens. Dissanayake and Macintosh (2003) also found,
paradoxically, that high-functioning children with
autism did unexpectedly well on the second-order
task despite scoring poorly on first-order FB (which
should, in theory, have been easier). They suggested
the heavy linguistic and memory burdens may have
prompted chance success through guessing, an
interpretation supported by high control-question
failure rates.
Beyond these assessment issues and constraints,
our expanded scale has theoretical grounding and
implications. In devising their scale, Wellman and
Liu (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of over 40
separate studies of typical preschoolers who took
FB tests as well as a test of one other cognate ToM
concept (e.g., obsolete desire, knowledge ⁄ igno-
rance). Those results informed the construction of
the original scale. Conceptually, all of the subjec-
tive mental states that the scale focuses on require
coordination between mentality and reality. This is
equally true of the coordinated understanding of
the objective situation (e.g., a rain-spoiled picnic)
and the actual (literal) meaning of the speaker’s
words that our sarcasm task assesses. Thus, while
well within the same mental-state domain, we
showed that sarcasm was more difficult than either
FB or emotional concealment for all groups. This
can plausibly be interpreted, as noted earlier, in
terms of the additional more complex coordina-
tions of mind versus reality (Filippova & Asting-
ton, 2008) that an understanding of sarcasm
requires.
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We used single scale items to assess each
sequential ToM concept, just as was done in the ori-
ginal scale, so that even this extended version could
be completed by children, including those with
developmental delay, in a single short session.
Further research with multiple tasks for each scale
step might be useful. However, complementary
research provides assurance that our results are not
limited to specific item characteristics. Meta-analy-
ses of typically developing children’s performance
on our own and other formats of the DD, DB, and
KA tasks (Wellman and Liu, 2004) and of FB (Well-
man et al., 2001) confirm clear within-age consisten-
cies, and clear cross-age differences, largely
irrespective of story content, or task format. Well-
man and colleagues (Wellman et al., 2006; Wellman
et al., 2011) found that an alternative version of the
HE task (about a boy wanting to conceal a negative
emotional reaction to an adult’s special gift) scaled
in exactly the same way as the original story about
peer teasing that we used. Similarly, Filippova and
Astington (2008) used eight different sarcasm sto-
ries similar to ours and found all produced similar
response patterns for typically developing children
in the age range we tested, as did Happe´ (1995)
with a pair of stories including her version of our
SARC item. Furthermore, as noted in the Method
section, our HE and SARC scenarios were very
similar in both involving peers’ affectively negative
communication. Additionally, their use of parallel
question formats extends the original scale’s careful
choice of comparable formats for all tasks.
Children With Autism or Deafness
From a theoretical perspective, these new insights
into ToM Scale progressions for children with
autism and for deaf children of hearing parents are of
special theoretical interest. In addition to these
groups’ widely confirmed FB delays (see Harris,
2006; Peterson, 2009; Tager-Flusberg, 2003, for
reviews), their delayed development contrasts not
only with the typical child’s earlier timetable but
also with the equally rapid scale progress (e.g., Peter-
son et al., 2005) and FB growth (e.g., Peterson &
Siegal, 1999; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002) of natively
signing children of deaf parents. Our new six-step
assessment of ToM development confirmed further,
extended delays for deaf children of hearing parents,
and confirmed similar, extended delays for children
with autism plus an alternative sequence, with com-
prehension of feigned emotion preceding FB.
Scaling ToM development for children with aut-
ism. How best to interpret this alternative sequence
is not yet fully clear. One possibility is that the unique
genetic and neurobiological features associated with
the autism disorder (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, 2003)
might be contributing factors. For example, under-
standing FB may constitute a representational ToM
achievement of special neurocognitive processing
difficulty, as is often assumed in neuroscience
research on autism. However, it is also worth consid-
ering additional hypotheses, including that the data
might reflect divergences in this groups’ admittedly
atypical social or conversational experiences. Con-
ceivably, distinctive early socialization experiences,
or educational training experiences, could have con-
tributed to the confirmed reversal of HE and FB steps
and to their overall delays. When reared in hearing
families, deaf toddlers and preschoolers have little
conversational exposure to others’ mental states,
especially to thoughts and beliefs not readily
expressed via pointing or facial expression and, as
we explain in detail below, this clearly contributes to
their ToM delays behind their natively signing deaf
peers. Following the same logic, the language delays
that are integral to an autism diagnosis (as distinct
from AS) may have the same restrictive effect on
participation in mentalistic conversation. Indeed,
naturalistic observation of parent–child interaction
reveals a substantial reduction in discussing cogni-
tion when the child has autism (Slaughter, Peterson,
& Macintosh, 2007). Impaired imagination may
further curtail conversational exposure to others’
belief states by precluding pretend play with siblings
and peers. And children with autism typically partic-
ipate in alternative educational situations and curric-
ula, including explicit social-cognitive instruction. In
sum, these distinctive experiences and restrictions
could contribute both to ToM delays, and to unique
task ordering, for children with autism.
Not only do these children’s triadic linguistic-,
social- and cognitive ⁄ imaginative-impairments
(APA, 2000) lead to atypical early social and con-
versational experiences, but schooling places chil-
dren with autism into a peer environment prone to
frequent teasing (Attwood, 2007), including sar-
casm or other ToM-dependent concepts. Specula-
tively, then, heightened social exposure to these
peer group situations could boost cognitive reflec-
tion upon them by older children with autism.
Relatedly, our HE task, by incorporating a scenario
about peers’ teasing, might sensitively probe the
autism group’s appropriate understanding of this
particular ToM concept. To reiterate, however, this
conversational-experiential hypothesis (see also
Astington, 2004; Harris, 2006) is only one of several
conceivable explanations for the autism-specific
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delays and reversal of scale steps and further
research is now clearly warranted, ideally including
direct observation of these children’s peer inter-
actions and any of the social skills education their
teachers might offer.
Deaf children’s ToM Scale development. The deaf
children of hearing parents in our sample scored
significantly below typically developing children
on ToM-6 even after statistically controlling age
and language ability. Indeed, as fully clear in
Table 1, these older deaf children performed almost
identically to the youngest typically developing
group (3-, 4-, and 5-year-old preschoolers). In this
way they paralleled delays seen in autism. Yet
these late-signing deaf children were selected as
being free not only of autism, or AS diagnoses, but
also of any additional developmental conditions
apart from hearing impairment. Furthermore, in
the signing classrooms we recruited from, these
children were not socially aloof and had extensive
opportunities to interact socially and conversation-
ally with signing deaf peers both in the classroom
and on the playground.
No deaf native signers were included in the
present sample (this 10% minority of the deaf
population consists of the offspring of signing
deaf parents acquire sign as their native language
from birth rather than belatedly upon school
entry). Past research (see Peterson, 2009, for a
review) indicates that native signers are swifter
than late signers to master both FB (e.g., Courtin
& Melot, 1998; Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Schick, de
Villiers, de Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007; Woolfe
et al., 2002) and the full five-step ToM Scale (Pe-
terson et al., 2005). Furthermore, this ToM contrast
between native signers and late signers is found
to apply over and above any contrasts in signed
or spoken language skill (Woolfe et al., 2002). It is
likely that late signers’ restricted access to early
family conversation at home accounts, at least in
part, for their slow ToM trajectory.
While this will explain overall pace of delays on
the six-step ToM Scale displayed by the deaf late
signers in our sample, their unusually poor perfor-
mance on the sarcasm task still remains remark-
able. Even though sarcasm was, as expected, the
hardest of all the tasks for every group, it was
harder still for deaf children even than for their
peers with autism. Indeed, despite their equal over-
all ToM-5 and ToM-6 scores, there was a sevenfold
difference in proportions of deaf versus autism
groups who passed sarcasm (3% vs. 23%). What
could explain the deaf group’s unusual difficulties?
We know of no previous empirical studies of deaf
children’s comprehension of irony or sarcasm, but
one early test of deaf adolescents’ identifications of
the figurative meanings of idioms (e.g., by pointing
at a happy face for ‘‘She is over the moon’’) showed
that only those with an advanced reading age
scored above chance (Fruchter, Wilbur, & Fraser,
1984). Similarly, case histories (e.g., Gregory et al.,
1995) indicate that conversational sarcasm and
word play often continue to confuse deaf adults,
irrespective of their mature fluency in sign or
speech. Thus, perhaps early family conversation
and ⁄or extended language experiences are impor-
tant here as well. In the signing classrooms we
recruited from, deaf children (with a peer group of
other deaf signers) are unlikely to encounter sar-
casm, since this particular form of humor is rarely
used even by deaf teenagers and young adults
(Gregory et al., 1995). Obviously, further research
into deaf children’s understanding of sarcasm is
now warranted, together with a further examina-
tion of the promising links shown here between
this understanding and that of other sequential
ToM components.
ToM development in AS. Though less central to
our primary theoretical and methodological aims,
our novel inclusion of a group of children with AS
was helpful for clarifying and extending the mixed
results of previous studies of: (a) whether ToM is
delayed for children with AS relative to the typical
timetable and (b) comparative rates of ToM mastery
for children with AS versus high-functioning aut-
ism. In much of this past research only a single
type of task has been used (usually FB), making it
hard to distinguish task-specific from general ToM-
related contrasts. Focally, results of past studies are
inconsistent with one another. As noted in the
Introduction, for example, Paynter and Peterson
(2010) found that even after controlling for age, IQ,
and language ability (vocabulary plus syntax), chil-
dren with AS scored as highly as matched typical
developers on a FB battery and above their peers
with autism. Yet Dissanayake and Macintosh (2003)
used a similar FB battery and found that younger
typically developing children outperformed older
children with AS. With comprehensive evidence
across six sequentially connected tasks, we show
that children with AS were indeed slower to master
overall ToM than their peers with typical develop-
ment, even after controlling for age and language
ability. Furthermore, children with AS and autism
performed equivalently once the effects of age and
language were statistically controlled.
These patterns have interesting implications.
Recall that an AS diagnosis via the DSM–IV ‘‘gold
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standard’’ (applied stringently in our study)
implies that although they diverge from their peers
with autism on one core symptom (early language
delays), children with AS and autism converge
on two core symptoms (debilitating deficits in
socialization and imaginative ⁄ cognitive flexibility;
Szatmari et al., 2009). In our study, despite still dis-
playing this language discrepancy, these two
groups were equivalently delayed in overall ToM
Scale progress. Thus, in terms of delayed ToM
understanding, the distinguishing language feature
appears less relevant than these groups’ two shared
diagnostic impairments. Perhaps, following the
above line about likely influences of atypical early
peer and family socialization for children with aut-
ism, similarly atypical early social experiences con-
sequent upon these shared diagnostic symptoms
might slow the growth of ToM for children with
AS. At school, these children are frequently victim-
ized by peer exclusion, taunting or ridicule
(Attwood, 2007). Furthermore, their more advanced
language skills could increase their sensitivity to, or
confusion by, the ToM paradoxes entailed by sar-
castic teasing or false emotional displays.
Thus, in line with reasoning articulated above for
autism, heightened socialization pressures may con-
ceivably have elevated the AS group’s ToM perfor-
mance specifically on SARC and HE tasks, just as
we speculated for autism. This interpretation is
broadly in keeping with Szatmari et al.’s (2000) find-
ing that social immaturity persists in children with
AS even in the context of clinically normal language
skills. While not assessing ToM, these authors fol-
lowed a group of children with AS longitudinally
from age 4 to age 7. Despite having had no initial
delays in language onset (consistent with their diag-
nosis) and despite maintaining normal levels of
language maturity throughout early and later child-
hood, these children scored as significantly less
socially mature than their typically developing peers
throughout the study. Furthermore, in the same
study, children with autism who had largely
‘‘caught up’’(p. 1986) linguistically by age 7 to their
peers with AS nevertheless remained substantially
delayed in social maturity independent of language
skill and nonverbal IQ. In other words, serious peer
relations problems are likely to persist well into
middle childhood in groups with AS and autism
even when these children’s language skills are not
seriously impaired. Such immaturely atypical peer
social relations might therefore conceivably relate to
the delays in ToM understanding that we observed
in both of these groups with autism spectrum dis-
orders in the manner suggested above.
At the same time, the scale performance of our
samples with autism and AS may help to diminish
earlier concerns that non-ToM-related heuristics or
‘‘hacking’’ strategies (Happe´, 1995) could enable
some language-adept children with these develop-
mental conditions to pass FB tests even when they
have no genuine understanding of ToM. Hacking
alternatives to mental-state reasoning are believed
to be cumbersome, time consuming, and task spe-
cific (see Happe´, 1995). Furthermore, these heuris-
tics apply to the characteristic features specific to
one task or another; most currently formulated
hacking heuristics are specific to FB. But our results
show more comprehensive delays and peculiarities,
and more comprehensive developments. Indeed, as
clear in Table 1, the same children with autism or
AS who answer FB correctly are as good, or better at
understanding HE. Arguably, something more than
low-level hacking seems to characterize the ToM
gains these children developmentally achieve pro-
gressively across all six scale steps.
Conclusions
The new six-step ToM Scale provides a valid,
more extended sequential progression of ToM
insights applicable with younger children but now
also with older more advanced children beyond the
preschool range. It should be useful for providing
more encompassing and efficient evaluation of
levels and progressions of ToM development in
typically and atypically developing groups. The
extended sequence also has clear value for the theo-
retical challenges of explaining how ToM develops
in children generally. In particular, these findings
include new evidence about sarcasm’s place in the
ToM progression, amplifying data and ideas about
the role of conversational and socially interactive
experience (Astington, 2001; Harris, 2006) in ToM
growth. Such experiences likely contribute both to
social-cognitive advances and to special challenges
encountered by some intelligent but atypically
developing children. Active and varied participa-
tion in social exchanges (Harris, 2006; Wellman,
2002) is likely to assist all children’s timely achieve-
ment of mature social understanding. But, with
development, these interchanges gain complexity
and increasingly include opinion exchange and
concealment, shared fantasizing, angry belief-based
disputes, teasing, joking, sarcasm, and other affec-
tively laden nonliteral uses of language. Even
though such conversational exchanges are part and
parcel of everyday social interaction, some of them
clearly continue to pose challenges that extend well
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into middle childhood, especially for children with
high-functioning autism or deafness in a hearing
family.
ToM is a developmental phenomenon now
shown to progress in a statistically reliable sequence
of steps beyond preschool. This is true both for
typically children and those with ToM delays owing
to deafness or autism-spectrum disorders. This
extended development has been surprisingly little
studied. The six-step ToM Scale validated here can
help us better understand the comprehensive nature
of ToM development. It does so in the current
research, and could do so in further applications to
typically developing and atypically developing
children.
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Appendix
Examples of Scored Responses to the SARC Test
Question (‘‘Why did she say ‘It’s a lovely day’?’’)
Taken From Each Group’s Transcripts
Pass (shows explicit awareness of
discrepancy between literal and
intended meaning)
Fail (no evidence of perceiving
nonliteral meaning)
She’s being sarcastic ⁄ sarcasm
She doesn’t mean it
Because it’s an idiom
She tricked him
Its her way of telling him she is
upset
Just to make up a little joke
She is saying politely that she is
not happy
Because she is a smart aleck
Because she is meaning ‘‘Why
tell me it was nice?’’
Because it is sunny [raining]
It’s lovely outside
She likes rain [picnics] ⁄We
need rain
She wants to play in the
puddles
Because she [the cake] got wet
Because he lied to her
She thought it was sunny ⁄did
not see clouds
She’s cross
To tell him off
Because it’s not sunny
So he doesn’t feel bad
Because he said it first
Because her Dad likes the rain
but she doesn’t
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